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LECTURE I11 
M E C H A N I S M ,  VITALISM, AND TELEOLOGY 
ANY non-mechanistic explanations of organic adap- M tations have been proposed, but they all agree in 
this-that they attribute organic structures and functions, 
especially those that are directed to particular ends, to some 
sort of will which is present as an uncaused cause, either in 
some supernatural being or beings, in the universe as a 
whole, or  in organisms themselves. 
Primitive people have generally regarded all the activities 
of nature as expressions of will, and a similar view has been 
maintained by certain philosophers even in modern times. 
As the only cause of his own actions which the primitive 
man knew was his will, so he attributed all activities every- 
where to will. Even inorganic nature was personified, not 
merely poetically, but actually; winds and waves, lightning 
and thunder, rain and snow, the regular succession of day 
and night, of seed-time and harvest, of life and death, were 
presided over by certain deities. Of course the actions of 
all animate things were supposed to be voluntary; their wills 
moved their bodies and directed their activities to desired 
ends. 
But step by step, before advancing knowledge of nature, 
supernaturalism withdrew from ordinary phenomena until 
it dwelt only on the misty mountain tops of origins and crea- 
tions. Likewise the voluntaristic conception of inorganic 
phenomena was gradually abandoned, though it has long 
persisted, and in a rather obscure form still persists, as an 
explanation of vital phenomena, and especially of organic 
adaptations. 
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1. Supernatural Des ign  
It was the fitness of living things which furnished the 
stock argument for the doctrine of supernatural design in 
nature. Since these fitnesses are evidently purposive, and 
since it ‘is no longer credible that intelligent purpose is to 
be found in the simplest plants and animals, it was argued 
that an intelligent Designer must have supernaturally cre- 
ated each and every one of these adaptations for the specific 
function which it now performs. This  doctrine reached its 
climax in the Bridgewater Treatises, in which natural his- 
tory became largely a study of the designs and purposes of 
the Creator as revealed in his creatures, and biology was 
made to serve as the handmaid of theology. 
But although adaptations are very general they are not 
universal, and although they are frequently very efficient 
they are not divinely perfect; indeed, all gradations of fit- 
ness are found in nature from a high degree of perfection 
to positive unfitness, and if all of these are the products 
of supernatural design some of them show more than human 
bungling. Furthermore, one “design” is frequently pitted 
against another; the parasite is exquisitely, one might sus- 
pect infernally, “designed” to prey upon its host, and the 
beast of prey upon its victim, but on the other hand the 
host is fitted to resist the parasite and the victim to escape 
its enemy. If adaptations are supernatural designs, they 
must be the designs of many intelligences working a t  odds 
rather than of one, and their prevalence in the living world 
would indicate that there are relatively few phenomena that 
are natural. Finally, the “frivolities of teleology” were 
carried to such an extent that they rendered the doctrine of 
the supernatural origin of every adaptation not only incred- 
ible but even ridiculous. And then came Darwinism, which 
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finally and forever put an end to this extravagant doctrine. 
“Bridgewaterism is dead.” As Darwin says, “There seems 
to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and 
in the action of natural selection than in the course which 
the wind blows.” T h e  adaptations of organisms are natural 
and not supernatural phenomena, and their causes are to be 
found, not in the individual creative acts of some infinite 
Designer but in natural forces and conditions. I t  may be that 
these forces and conditions are a t  present unknown and their 
method of action mysterious, but a t  least they are natural, 
unless all distinctions between nature and the supernatural 
are to be abandoned. Certainly the fertilization of an egg, 
the development of an embryo, the formation of an eye, 
acclimatization to extreme temperatures, tolerance for poi- 
sons, repairs of injuries, etc., are natural phenomena, and 
neither religion nor science, poetry nor truth, are served by 
denying this fact. 
2. Vitalism 
A t  present there are few if any defenders of the dogma 
that each and every adaptation was supernaturally created 
for  the purpose which it now serves, but there are many 
who maintain that living things contain some sort of intel- 
ligence, will, or  soul which directs their activities to desired 
ends. T h e  phenomena of life are so mysterious and won- 
derful and so different from inorganic phenomena that to 
the great majority of mankind it seems incredible that they 
should be the effects of purely mechanistic causes. Accord- 
ingly from time immemorial the activities of animals and 
plants have been attributed to some mysterious vital force, 
anima, spiritus rector, unconscious purpose, or  will, which 
is wholly different from the causes of inorganic phenom- 
ena, which lies beyond the reach of  scientific investigation, 
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and which is more inexplicable than the phenomena it is 
supposed to explain. T o  account for  the phenomena of life 
by ascribing them to vi tal ism is no more helpful or  intel- 
ligible than to explain the properties of water as due to 
hydrism or  of light to photism.  These are merely names 
without intelligible meaning. Explanations that explain must 
be in terms of other and better known phenomena. 
I n  contrasting vitalism and mechanism it should be under- 
stood that the term “mechanism” is not used in the sense of  
philosophical “materialism” nor of “mechanics” in its nar- 
rower physical meaning, but rather to connote the regular 
and invariable sequence of cause and effect, o r  the principle 
of causality. Furthermore, it is the function of science to 
classify but not to give ultimate explanations of phenomena; 
to explain phenomena only in the sense of reducing them to 
common causes, to deal only with proximate causes and 
never with final ones. For  example, the law of gravity does 
not explain the ultimate causes and mysteries of falling 
bodies, but it reduces a thousand causes and mysteries to one. 
Scientific explanations of life or  of anything else attempt 
nothing more than this. 
T h e  biologist is often asked, either narvely or  scornfully, 
“What  is life?” One might as well ask, “What  is matter, 
mind, energy?” No final and complete answer to such ques- 
tions is possible; these fundamentals can be defined only in 
terms of their properties and proximate causes. L i f e  is a 
complex of many  structures and functions associated with 
peculiar conditions of ma t t e r .  It is never manifested except 
in connection with protoplasm, “the physical basis of life,” 
and this is an organization of many parts. T h e  universal 
form of protoplasmic organization is the cell, which is the 
smallest unit of structure and function capable of indepen- 
dent existence. T h e  most general and distinctive proper- 
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ties of life are:  ( I )  protoplasmic and cellular organization, 
( 2 )  metabolism, ( 3 )  reproduction, (4) sensitivity, ( 5 )  
adaptability. 
Are these properties explicable in terms of physics and 
chemistry, and to what extent may they be duplicated in 
not-living matter? Does the law of cause and effect apply 
here as elsewhere in nature? Theoretical mechanism would 
answer each of these questions in the affirmitive, vitalism in 
the negative. But practically and actually, the mechanist 
knows that there are many properties and phenomena of 
life which cannot a t  present be explained in terms of physics 
and chemistry, though he has faith that they may ultimately 
be so explained. On the other hand, the vitalist knows that 
the immediate causes of certain life processes are physical 
and chemical, though it is always possible to assume that 
the more remote causes are not. 
Certain simulacra of protoplasm and of cells have been 
produced artificially, but they bear only a few resemblances 
to the real living substance. Such artificial products show 
that some structures and functions of living cells may be ex- 
plained in terms of chemistry and physics, but the more we 
know of protoplasm and cells the less likely it seems that 
it will ever be possible to synthesize them artificially. 
Fo r  the past two o r  three hundred years, and ever in- 
creasingly up to the present time, physiology has been deal- 
ing with the chemistry and physics of living matter, and 
especially of metabolism. Since the time of Lavoisier it 
has been known that combustion goes on in the body, oxygen 
being consumed and carbon dioxide given off, as in combus- 
tion outside the body. Digestion is a chemical process which 
can be duplicated in the laboratory. Muscular contraction 
and even nerve conduction are accompanied by well known 
chemical and physical changes. No one now questions the 
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fact that many vital processes may be explained in terms 
of chemistry and physics. Even the strongest adherents of 
vitalism must recognize the fact that  neither matter nor 
energy is created or destroyed in an organism, but that  
these merely undergo transformations (metabolism). All 
energy of an animal comes from its food just as the energy 
of an engine comes from its fuel; the vital machine is as 
dependent upon food as the engine is on fuel. However, 
only the first and last steps in constructive and destructive 
metabolism are known; the middle step, assimilation, is 
still a good deal of a mystery, but it is probably a chemical 
process in which each of the many kinds and varieties of 
protoplasm is built up out of the common nutrient materials 
through the action of specific enzymes. 
T h e  properties of reproduction, irritability, and adapta- 
bility are more distinctive of living things and are more 
difficult to explain on a physico-chemical basis than is me- 
tabolism. Certain analogies to each of these processes are 
found in the inorganic world, and certain steps in each of 
them are plainly physico-chemical in origin, but it must be 
admitted that there is left a large residuum which cannot 
a t  present be explained on mechanistic grounds. However, 
much progress is being made in this direction, and this justi- 
fies the hope that many more, if not all, vital processes will 
ultimately be explained in this way; certainly there seems to 
be no justification fo r  abandoning the search for mechanistic 
explanations a t  a time when they are being found as never 
before, nor for turning a t  once from a mechanistic philoso- 
phy of life to obscurantism or  mysticism. For although 
mechanism may not in the last analysis explain vital phe- 
nomena, or  anything else for that matter, it is evident that 
very much of a mechanistic nature remains to be discovered 
in organisms, and the great advantage of mechanism over 
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vitalism is not only that it is more intelligible but also that 
it encourages scientific investigation, whereas a thorough- 
going belief in vitalism discourages research. 
Of late several notable attacks have been made upon the 
mechanistic conception of life, particularly with reference 
to the causes of adaptation. Bergson, Driesch, Noll, Pauly, 
Reinke, Schneider, Thomson, G. Wolff and other “neo- 
vitalists” hold that many vital processes are indeterminate, 
non-predictable, non-mechanistic, and creative ; they attempt 
to solve the riddles of life by a direct appeal to mysterious 
conditions or principles which are found only in living things. 
Bergson’s evidence for his e‘lan vital is found in part  in 
phenomena of pirallel or convergent evolution. H e  main- 
tains that, starting from different sources and proceeding by 
wholly different routes, organisms may reach the same termi- 
nus. For  example, he holds that the eye of the mollusk, 
Pecten, and the eye of a vertebrate are practically the same 
in structure, though they have evolved by wholly different 
paths and from wholly different sources; or again, that  
societies of ants and of men are fundamentally alike, al- 
though they have evolved in entirely different ways. If iden- 
tical results can thus come from wholly different causes, 
there is scientific indeterminism, and some principle other 
than cause and effect must be involved, some form of vital- 
ism rather than mechanism. 
But neither in the living nor the not-living world do iden- 
tical results come from dissimilar causes: in short, conver- 
gent evolution does not result in identical structures. When 
Mivart  denied that homologies are evidences of evolution 
and claimed that the eye of a cuttle-fish and the eye of a 
vertebrate were homologous, though they could not have had 
a common origin, Darwin replied by showing that these two 
types of eyes are in no sense homologous: that  is, they are 
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fundamentally dissimilar though superficially alike. And in 
reply to Bergson it may be said that although the eye of 
Pecten is in a single feature, namely, the inverted retina, 
like the vertebrate eye, it is in other respects fundamentally 
different. These eyes are not homologous and Bergson’s 
contention is groundless. 
Neither are the similarities between societies of ants and 
men, and many other examples of a like nature which are 
cited by Bergson, real homologies or examples of convergent 
evolution. T h e  similarities which are present are merely 
such as are due to principles of universal application, such 
as the extension of differentiation and integration from indi- 
viduals or  persons to colonies and states. Practically all 
of Bergson’s cases of convergent evolution are of this sort. 
They indicate only the essential unity of all living things, 
that certain properties are characteristic of all life and are 
present in the simplest as well as in the most complex organ- 
isms. They certainly do not prove that life processes are 
indeterminate or that  identical results may follow different 
causes, and therefore that vital activity is non-mechanistic. 
I t  is true that it is often impossible to  predict what living 
things will do, but this is probably owing to  the fact that  
the factors involved are very numerous and complex. When- 
ever the number of factors is large and the times and cir- 
cumstances of their action numerous, it  is difficult to predict 
results, as is seen for example in so simple a phenomenon 
as the weather. This is especially true of the behavior of 
higher animals, for  here the number of factors is much 
greater than in many inorganic phenomena and the inter- 
actions of these factors are most complex. Professor W. K. 
Brooks used to comment upon the ease of predicting what 
would happen when you kick a stone, as compared with the 
difficulty of predicting the results of kicking a dog. I n  the 
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latter case one needs to take into account many hereditary 
and environmental factors; one needs to know the breed 
and size of the dog, whether he is a t  home or not, whether 
the one who kicks is a stranger or not, etc. There is good 
reason to believe that when all these factors are taken into 
account the results in the case of the dog would be as pre- 
dictable as in that of the stone. Certainly none of the cases 
cited by Bergson proves that the activities of animals are 
indeterminate and non-mechanistic. 
Driesch also has maintained that adaptive responses in 
general cannot be explained by mechanistic science. His  first 
proof of vitalism is that a living thing is a *‘harmonic, equi- 
potential system”; that is, “the pattern of the whole exists 
in every part,” and under suitable conditions a fragment of 
an egg, embryo, or adult can give rise to  a typical whole. 
Likewise, when the cells and nuclei of segmenting eggs are. 
forced out of their normal positions by pressure normal 
development may result, and Driesch holds that neither 
cytoplasm, nucleus, nor medium are the causes of differentia- 
tion, but that “the fate of a part  is a function of its position” 
in the whole, and that “any part  is capable of any fate.” 
Some organisms may be cut up in the three dimensions of 
space and yet each fragment that is sufficiently large mag 
give rise to a complete organism like the original one. It 
is inconceivable, he says, that any machine could be broken 
up in this way and yet the parts be capable of becoming 
complete. H e  therefore concludes that something, not 
mechanistic nor causal, lies in the background of develop- 
ment; this something he calls, in the language of Aristotle, 
“entelechy.” 
His  second proof of vitalism is drawn from the genesis 
of this complex equipotential system. It is absurd to sup- 
pose, he says, that  any machine could give rise to such a sys 
3 6 0 Problems of Organic Adaptation 
tem, and again he invokes the aid of “entelechy.” Finally, 
he finds a third proof of vitalism in the field of behavior, 
o r  what he calls the “individuality of correspondence be- 
tween stimuli and responses.” I n  such cases something non- 
mechanistic interferes when the good of the organism re- 
quires it, and this something, which resembles the “indwell- 
ing soul” of Plato, he calls “psychoid.” I n  short, Driesch’s 
three of vitalism are all based upon adaptive re- 
sponses. 
However, all the parts of living things, whether eggs, 
embryos, or  adults, are rarely, i f  ever, equipotential. Even 
parts of the embryos of the sea-urchin, upon which Driesch 
did much of his work and based most of his conclusions, 
are not equipotential in the chief axis; that  is, fragments 
from the upper or  lower poles are not capable of regenerat- 
ing a whole embryo or larva. Fragments of the hydroid 
Tubularia are not equipotential so far as proportionality is 
concerned (Child),  Regeneration in the ascidian Clavelina 
is complicated by degeneration, regeneration, and budding 
(ZurStrassen) . T h e  different cleavage cells of the eggs of 
mollusks, annelids, and ascidians are not equipotential, and 
when one of these cells is destroyed its function is not taken 
by other cells, but the embryo remains incomplete (mosaic 
development). 
When Driesch maintains that neither cytoplasm, nucleus, 
nor medium is the cause of differentiation what can he 
mean? All of these factors are in varying ways and de- 
grees the causes of differentiation. And when he asserts 
that  it is inconceivable that any machine could be broken up 
in the three dimensions of space and the fragments still be 
capable of producing whole machines, or  that  it is absurd 
to suppose that any machine could give rise to an equipoten- 
tial system, it is evident that  his conception of a machine is 
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too narrowly limited to those of human invention. T h e  liv- 
ing machine is not a single one, as is an engine o r  a watch, 
but i t  is composed of machines within machines. Every liv- 
ing body is composed of cells within which are  nuclei. T h e  
visible differentiations of a body are developed from the 
portion of the cell outside of the nucleus, but always under 
the influence of the nucleus. T h e  nucleus itself rarely under- 
goes differentiation, so that there is in every such nucleus 
a complete machine which under certain conditions may be 
capable of developing a complete organism, as in the case 
of development from an egg cell. If this nuclear machine 
is fragmented or  destroyed no regeneration is possible. 
Therefore the machine-theory of organization does not 
fail in this case; only Driesch’s conception of the vital ma- 
chine fails because the real organism is more complex than 
he supposed. 
But even granting Driesch’s claims that organisms are 
equipotential systems capable of complete regeneration 
after injury, that  they differ greatly from machines of 
human invention, and that they generally respond benefi- 
cially to stimuli, it does not follow that they are in any 
respect removed from the field of mechanistic causality. 
I n  the works of Bergson, Driesch, Thomson and other 
%eo-vitalists” hundreds of pages are devoted to labored 
refutations of mechanistic explanations of life and to elo- 
quent presentations of mystical, allegorical, and unintelli- 
gible causes. I n  a notable contribution by Jennings‘ the 
ground is cleared of mere verbiage and the solid founda- 
tions of a mechanistic conception of life are laid in eighteen 
pages. Jennings shows that diversities in life phenomena 
are accompanied or  preceded by diversities in materials, 
functions, and structures, and that they are not indeter- 
“‘Life and Matter.” Johns Hopkins Univ. Circ., 1914. 
3 6 2 Problems of Organic Adaptation 
minate or  capricious. H e  points to the very significant fact 
that  there is no evidence of life apart  from protoplasm, and 
that such phenomena as development, adaptation, reason, 
and purpose are not annulled if they are found to be bound 
up with matter, for it is no more extraordinary that they 
should be associated with matter than that they should be 
separate from it. 
I n  living as in lifeless things, mechanistic factors are not 
merely additive as Driesch maintains, but they are fre- 
quently creative. In  chemical compounds new qualities ap- 
pear which were not present in any of the elements entering 
the compounds. No one could predict beforehand the quali- 
ties of water from the properties of hydrogen and oxygen, 
and in general one cannot predict the results of combinations 
before they have been learned by experience. T h e  fact that  
one could not predict consciousness from a knowledge of 
the organic or  inorganic constituents of the body is not 
fundamentally different from these other cases in which new 
things are formed by new combinations. T h e  “creative evo- 
lution” of Bergson is not different in principle from “crea- 
tive synthesis,” which is found everywhere in the living 
and the lifeless worlds; it is therefore no proof of vitalism. 
T h e  new vitalism no less than the old has failed a t  every 
point to establish its main proposition, namely, that the 
reactions of organisms are not causal, and that they require, 
in order to explain them, a special principle which is lacking 
in the inorganic world and which is non-mechanistic in action 
and wholly unrelated to the principle of cause and effect. 
This is not to deny that there may be a teleological principle 
in all nature, but rather to affirm that there is no sufficient 
reason fo r  supposing that in this regard the living world 
differs fundamentally from the lifeless. 
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3. Mechanism and Purpose 
T h e  only mechanism of adaptation that has ever been 
suggested is the elimination of the unfit and the persistence 
of the fit. Inherited or racial adaptations may be explained 
as the result of the elimination of unfit individuals (“per- 
sonal selection” or “Darwinism” in the strict sense), while 
acquired adaptations and useful responses to new conditions 
can be accounted for by the elimination of unfit structures 
and functions within the individual (intra-personal and re- 
actional selection). Thus the simple mechanical principles 
of overproduction of varied individuals o r  reactions and the 
elimination of the less fit furnish a mechanistic explana- 
tion of all kinds of fitness in the living world. 
But in man a t  least, and probably also in some of the 
higher animals, there is conscious purpose, and the behavior 
of many lower animals suggests that they also possess some- 
thing similar to human purpose, though it is probably not 
accompanied by consciousness. If conscious purpose has 
evolved during the course of evolution, as it certainly de- 
velops during the individual development of man, do we 
not here find a phenomenon which cannot be explained as 
due to  mechanistic causes? And if conscious purpose is non- 
mechanistic in its origin, is it not probable that “unconscious 
purpose,” such as is manifested in the many apparently pur- 
posive responses of digestion, respiration, circulation, devel- 
opment, regulation, and the adaptive behavior of lower or- 
ganisms, is also non-mechanistic? In  short, i f  we approach 
this problem of fitness from the standpoint of human con- 
sciousness rather than from that of the physiology of the 
lowest organisms, from the top rather than from the bot- 
tom, do we not find that the mechanistic philosophy fails 
to furnish an adequate explanation? Mechanism must ac- 
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count for purpose in man, as well as for fitness in lower or- 
ganisms, if it is a universal principle. 
It is this point of view that gives weight and force to 
non-mechanistic philosophy. Any system that denies will 
and purpose to man must be false, not only because it con- 
tradicts one of the most fundamental facts of consciousness, 
one of the most general experiences of men, but also because 
it is impractical and unlivable. 
If man is the product of mere chance or accident; if as one biologist 
has said, “The  evolution of consciousness is the greatest blunder in 
the universe.”; i f  men live and die like the beasts and leave only their 
bones and implements behind; if  life and evolution and consciousness 
are purposeless and lead to  nothing-if this were the teaching of the 
mechanistic philosophy, then certainly it would be true that it debases 
man, and destroys the hopes of mankind. T h e  blighting effect of 
such a philosophy is that it substitutes blind chance and necessity 
for plan and purpose, both in nature and in human life. If there is 
no teleology in nature, the course of evolution leading to man and to 
consciousness is the result of blind and blundering accident. If there 
is no purpose or value in human labor and suffering, life is not worth 
living, and the only sane and sensible thing to do is to end i t  all by 
suicide and race extinction. 
But there are evidences of teleology in nature and of purpose in 
human life. Even struggle, suffering, and death have their value if 
in the long course of evolution they lead to progress. Men do not die 
and leave only their bones and implements, but “they rest from their 
labors and their works do follow them.” “Others have labored and 
we have entered into their labors.” Civilization is what it is today 
because of the labor and influence of millions of persons, most of whoin 
are wholly unknown to us. Only a few men have achieved immortal 
fame, but multitudes have contributed to human progress.’ 
I n  man a t  least intelligent purpose exists and must be ac- 
counted for. Here is the crucial test of universal mechanism 
-the purpose, consciousness, soul of man ! If these psychic 
phenomena are not mechanistic in origin some principle 
other than mechanistic causality is present in man; and when 
‘“Direction of Human Evolution,’’ pp. 231, 232. 
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we observe the purposive actions of animals, for example 
crows dropping mussels on rocks to break them open, cats 
turning buttone to open doors, or  horses unlatching gates, 
it is evident that we are here dealing with the same funda- 
mental problem that we have in human purpose. Finally, 
even non-conscious and purely instinctive acts, that  are pur- 
posive, belong in the same category; for example, the mat- 
ing, nest-building, brooding, and care of young on the part  
of birds, or  similar reproductive habits of mammals, show 
instinctive, but not perceptual purpose. In  man only, so 
far  as we know, does purposive action at  certain times rise 
into the field of consciousness, but most of his activities are 
non-conscious, although they are purposive. All such phe- 
nomena, from conscious purpose at  one extreme to instinc- 
tive reactions and to tropisms at  the other, seem to be fun- 
damentally akin, and if  mechanism fails to explain any of 
them it probably fails with all; if tropisms and instincts are 
entirely explicable on mechanistic grounds, it is probable 
that even perceptual purpose may be so explained. 
I n  commenting upon the fact that  adaptations are mech- 
anisms for securing the persistence of organisms, Roux’ 
says: “Persistence is not an aim of living things but an in- 
dispensably necessary condition. Life cannot suddenly arise 
anew, but if it exists it must be preserved, and so must before 
all be capable of persisting, otherwise it disappears. This  is 
no aim but a direct necessity of its existence.” 
But after all, the real question is how living things are 
able to meet these necessary conditions of life. I t  may be 
granted that adaptations are not caused by conscious aims 
o r  purposes, but their results are much the same as if they 
were; they do attain certain desirable ends, and to this ex- 
tent they are purposive. But results may be purposive while 
’Arch. Entwick. Mech. Bd. 26. 1908. 
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their causes are mechanistic; the contrary view is due to a 
false conception of purpose or  of mechanism. There are 
good reasons for believing that purpose and will in ourselves 
are not uncaused but rather that  they are results of ante- 
cedent causes; that  they also are links in the chain of cause 
and effect, and hence are mechanistic in origin. 
W e  have already found that many of the beneficial re- 
sponses of protozoa and germ-cells are the residuum left 
after the elimination of non-beneficial responses; in these 
cells, however, there is little if any capacity to profit by 
experience. On  the other hand, a cat that  by random move- 
ments accidentally unlatches a door and lets itself out, as 
in Thorndike’s experiment, gradually omits useless move- 
ments, remembers past successes, and finally learns to un- 
latch the door a t  once, thus showing intelligent purpose, 
developed through the mechanistic process of the elimina- 
tion of useless responses. Are intelligence and purpose in 
man fundamentally different from this? There is every 
reason to believe that human beings arrive a t  intelligence 
and reason by the same process-a process of many trials 
and errors, a few trials and successes, a remembering of 
these past experiences, and an application of them to new 
conditions. All solving of problems, directed thinking and 
consecutive reasoning are accompanied by, if they do not 
consist in, rapid elimination of unfit ideas and mental activi- 
ties. Thus intelligence and purpose in man, no less than fit- 
ness in all organisms, may be explained as results of the 
elimination of the unfit; they also are adaptations; and for 
this reason, if fo r  no other, adaptations appear to be intel- 
ligent and purposive. 
4 .  Teleology 
Nevertheless, this mechanistic explanation of fitness and 
purpose is not complete and many things are left unex- 
Mechanism, Vitalism, and Teleology 3 6 7 
plained. For  example, the mechanism of trial and error by 
which Paramecium avoids extremes of heat and cold is 
based upon its ability to distinguish between favorable and 
unfavorable, or  between satisfactory and unsatisfactory, 
conditions. I n  some of the simplest forms of living things 
as well as in the most complex this capacity exists, and for 
the present a t  least it cannot be accounted for on mechanis- 
tic grounds. Thus  in our mechanistic explanation of fitness 
we put in a t  the beginning what we get out a t  the end, 
namely, a capacity to distinguish between the fit and the 
unfit, and a tendency to retain the one and eliminate the 
other. And so in all mechanistic sciences from mathematics 
to biology, we introduce in one form o r  another in our 
factors the qualities which we seek to explain in the end 
product. I t  is said that in some rural districts hogs are 
weighed by driving them on to one side of a balanced plat- 
form, throwing stones on to the other side until they equal 
the weight of the hogs, and then guessing a t  the weight of 
the stones. When we attempt to explain the actual origin of 
fundamental qualities by quantitative mechanistic methods, 
do we not, with much labor, perform a similar operation? 
It is a striking fact that a t  present it is impossible to explain 
the organization of a cell, the potencies of development or  
of evolution, or  the elements of fitness, purpose, and con- 
sciousness on purely mechanistic grounds. “ I t  is because liv- 
ing things are irritable, registrative, persistent, variable, that  
they have been able to evolve in adaptive ways,” but we can- 
not explain the fact that  they possess these qualities. Thus 
we introduce on one side of the equation the equivalents of 
the things on the other side which we seek to explain. 
In  a recent treatise on evolution in its widest aspects, 
Macfarlanel has proposed as one of the principal factors in 
‘“Causes and Couries of Organic Evolution,” p. 628. 
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evolution and adaptation what he calls “proenvironment” : 
this he defines as “the capacity of any organism for perceiv- 
ing and then positively growing o r  moving toward an envi- 
ronment that is the most satisfying for it.” This capacity 
he holds is present in all living things and has its analogue 
even in chemical affinity. Certainly when one observes how 
almost universally organisms distinguish between benefi- 
cial and injurious environments, one is compelled to admit 
that some such capacity must be present in all living things, 
and that it must be an  important factor in the adaptive or  
beneficial responses of organisms. Whether it is also a 
factor in the evolution of racial adaptations depends upon 
the answer to the question whether such individual o r  ac- 
quired adaptations can become hereditary. Macfarlane 
takes it for granted that they can be, and he would probably 
maintain, though he has not developed this thesis specifi- 
cally, that  all inherited adaptations were in their individual 
origins beneficial or satisfying responses to the environment. 
Against this view may be urged all the weighty objections 
to the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired adaptations 
which are familiar t o  all biologists. I t  is difficult if not im- 
possible to explain on this ground the origin of numerous 
inherited adaptations which are for the good of the species 
only and are destructive of the individual; for example, 
the peculiar structures, functions, and instincts of worker 
and drone bees, which lead to the sacrifice of the indi- 
vidual fo r  the good of the colony, cannot be explained by 
any form of Lamarckism, but are readily explained by 
Darwinism. 
According to the Darwinian theory, the guiding and 
directing power of selection should be directly proportional 
to its severity. If it eliminates only those mutants that  are 
positively injurious or  non-viable, as many adherents of the 
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mutation theory believe, would it be possible to explain such 
perfect adaptations as are found, for  example, in the eye? 
If these be attributed to the chance occurrence of favorable 
mutations, do we not place upon chance a perfectly im- 
possible burden when we load upon it not only all the won- 
derful adaptations in such an organ as the eye, but also all 
the multitudes of adaptations and coadaptations which exist 
in every part  and function of man or  one of the higher 
animals ? 
Most  of all, when we turn from analysis to synthesis and 
consider the whole course of organic evolution from ameba 
to man, from the simplest motor responses to the develop- 
ment of an intellect capable of studying the universe and its 
origin, are we impressed with the idea that evolution has 
been guided by something other than chance. Progressive 
evolution consists in increasing complexity of organization 
and in increasing adaptation to the environment. I t  is prob- 
ably no accident that  organization, mutations, and environ- 
ment have been so correlated that they have led to the per- 
fection of organization and adaptation which we see all 
about us. Evolution has not been an eternal seesaw: it has 
led somewhere. T h e  fact that organisms can adapt them- 
selves to changing environment is no accident; the fact that 
environment has so changed as to bring about progress is 
no accident. Philosophically, it is difficult to avoid the con- 
clusion that evolution has revealed a larger teleology than 
was ever dreamed of before-a teleology which differs from 
vitalism in that it takes in not only the living but also the 
lifeless world. 
And yet science cannot deal with teleology but only with 
causes and effects and mechanisms ; given matter and energy 
and life, with all their potentialities, science deals with the 
succession of events in evolution, explaining them in a purely 
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mechanistic manner. I n  biology the desire for simple me- 
chanical explanations is so great that it often causes us to 
minify the difficulties and magnify the successes of such ex- 
planations. W e  may temporarily close our eyes to these 
difficulties, but they remain and must be reckoned with. 
Few persons have the intellectual honesty of Darwin, who 
wrote down a t  once the objections to his theory as they 
occurred to him, lest he might forget them, and who con- 
fessed that he never thought of explaining the evolution 
of the eye without a shudder. But even if  an ultimate 
mechanistic explanation of adaptations is not possible, it 
does not follow that we must at once resort to an explana- 
tion which is either non-mechanistic or  supernatural. Many 
things which were once supposed to be due to supernatural 
causes are now readily explained by natural ones. T h e  ear- 
lier students of evolution proposed absurdly simple mechani- 
cal explanations of the process. Later these were replaced 
by more complex mechanisms, and when these latter fail to 
offer a satisfactory explanation the scientific solution must 
be sought in more and more complex mechanisms; for 
science deals only with mechanisms, and a scientific explana- 
tion must be mechanistic. 
Some of the world’s great philosophers and scientists, from Aris- 
totle and Plato to Kant, Schopenhauer, Lamarck, Cope, Bergson, 
Driesch, and Henderson, have maintained that the fitness and order 
of nature can be explained only by assuming that there is some sort 
of teleological principle in nature, which lies back of or runs parallel 
with the principle of causality-something which acts more or less 
like human will o r  purpose, and which is itself an uncaused cause 
lying outside the field of scientific inquiry. 
Kant has expressed this opinion in a well-known passage: “It is 
quite certain that we cannot become sufficiently acquainted with 
organized creatures and their hidden potentialities by aid of purely 
mechanical natural principles, much less that we can explain them; 
and this is so certain that we may boldly assert that it is absurd for 
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man even to conceive such an idea, or to hope that a Newton may one 
day arise to make even the production of a blade of grass compre- 
hensible, according to natural laws ordained by no intention.” 
Haeckel and other pure mechanists have hailed Darwin as Kant’s 
impossible Newton of the living world and his theory of “natural 
Selection” as the purely mechanical principle which accounts for the 
adaptations of organisms. . . . In the light of Darwin’s theory 
we see that adaptations are the results of natural causes: the causal 
mechanism applies to all the fitnesses of nature as well as to other 
phenomena; but back of all mechanism, or  running through all 
mechanism, is teleology or  purpose. 
From the standpoint of science and philosophy the origin of this 
order and mechanism is the great secret of the universe. Science 
deals only with mechanisms, and a purely scientific explanation must 
be mechanistic, but there is no mechanical explanation for the ulti- 
mate mechanism of the universe; mechanism cannot explain itself. 
T h e  mechanism of a locomotive will explain what it does, but it will 
not explain its origin nor the purpose which it subserves. T h e  organi- 
zation of an animal or plant or egg is said to explain what it does, 
but i t  will not explain the teleological nature of that organization. 
Biologists no longer think of any adaptation as having been directly 
created for the purpme which i t  now serves but rather as having been 
slowly developed in the course of evolution. Nevertheless, in tracing 
an adaptation to its sources we do no more than transfer the origin 
of fitness to earlier causes. W e  may explain the fimess of the eye as 
due to its ontogenetic development, and this as due to heredity and 
environment, but this does not explain how the potentialities of the 
eye came to be in the germ-plasm. We have merely shifted the problem 
to an earlier stage. And the same is true of the evolution of eyes: 
our explanation of the origin of eyes may be that they are due to 
mutation and natural selection, or to the inherited effects of use and 
disuse: but in either case we do not explain the fact that eyes were 
potentially present in these causes. W e  have merely shifted the prob- 
lem from the fitness of results to the fitness of the causes of those 
results: and in spite of Darwin and his great theory, it is still true 
that no Newton has yet arisen “to make even the production of a 
blade of grass comprehensible, according to natural laws ordained 
by no intention.”’ 
In two recent books of great philosophical and scientific 
value, Henderson has shown that very many elements of the 
’Conklin, “Direction of Human Evolution,” pp. 221-224. 
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environment are chemically and physically the best possible 
for  life phenomena. In  particular, water, carbonic acid and 
the compounds of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen possess 
many unique properties which are necessary to life, and these 
substances are better fitted to the life processes than any 
other known substances. H e  concludes, “Therefore the fit- 
ness of the environment is both real and unique.” T h e  origin 
of this fitness of the environment for life “lies a t  least as f a r  
back as the phenomena of the periodic system, a t  least as 
far  back as the evolution of the elements, if they were ever 
evolved.” And yet he holds that i t  “is conclusively proven 
that the whole process of cosmic evolution from its earliest 
conceivable state to the present is pure mechanism.” I n  ex- 
planation of this fitness which runs through the whole of 
nature, he concludes that it is conceivable that a teleological 
“tendency would work parallel with mechanism without in- 
terfering with it. T h e  effect of such a tendency working 
steadily through the whole process of evolution is also a t  
least conceivable, however small its bearing upon science, 
provided, like time itself, it be a perfectly independent vari- 
able, making up therefore, with time the constant environ- 
ment, so to speak, of the evolutionary process. This  ten- 
dency must not be demonstrable either by weighing or  by 
measuring, else it would amount to an interference with the 
mechanistic process, and it must not itself be liable to any 
kind of variation whose detection would directly reveal it. 
Where,  then, can the origin of such a tendency be located? 
Why, clearly, if we accept the induction in favor of mechan- 
ism, only where Bergson’ has shrewdly placed his vital im- 
pulse, a t  the very origin of things, just before mechanism 
begins to act. I n  short, our new teleology cannot have 
lBergson places his vi tal  impulse not a t  the origin of the universe but 
only at  the beginnings of life. It is a form of v i t a l i s m  ra ther  than of general 
t e l e o l o g y .  
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originated in or  through mechanism, but it is a necessary and 
preestablished associate of mechanism. Matter  and energy 
have an original property, assuredly not by chance, which 
organizes the universe in space and time.”’ 
These important philosophical conclusions supplement but 
do  not destroy a mechanistic interpretation of nature. If 
the chemical and physical characteristics of the environment 
had been very different from what they are, life as we know 
it could not have existed on the earth, just as it is probable 
that life does not exist on the moon because of the absence 
of water and of an atmosphere. I t  does not necessarily fol- 
low that the environment was made as it is for  the purpose 
of supporting life, or  that  prospective life was a cause of 
antecedent environment, but it is impossible to reflect upon 
this fitness of the environment and indeed the whole order 
of nature without recognizing our inability to explain finally 
such phenomena on purely mechanistic grounds. 
This conception of a general teleological principle run- 
ning through all nature differs from vitalism in that it rec- 
ognizes no world-wide distinction between the organic and 
the inorganic; both of these belong to the same universe; 
in both mechanism is universal, and so also is teleology. 
Here is common ground upon which mechanists, vitalists, 
and religionists may take their stand; for the thing which 
mechanists desire to prove is not the absence of teleology 
but the universal presence of mechanism, while the proposi- 
tion. which defenders of vitalism and of religion are con- 
cerned to prove is not the absence of mechanism but the 
presence of teleology. 
Some of the most profound students of nature from the 
ancient Greeks to the present time have thought it necessary 
to assume some initial teleological principle. Weismann, 
‘“The Fitness of the  Environment,” pp. 307, 308. 
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whom Bernard Shaw counts the chief of scientific sinners 
because of his advocacy of a mechanistic conception of evo- 
lution, believed that extreme mechanism was consistent with 
extreme teleology; indeed, he maintained, “The most com- 
plete mechanism conceivable is likewise the most complete 
teleology conceivable. Wi th  this conception vanish all ap- 
prehensions that the new views of evolution would cause 
man to lose the best that he possesses-morality and purely 
human culture.” And no less a mechanist than Huxley said, 
“Perhaps the most remarkable service to the philosophy 
of biology rendered by Mr .  Darwin is the reconciliation 
of teleology and morphology, and the explanation of the 
facts of both which his views offer. T h e  teleology which 
supposes that the eye, such as we see it in man or one of the 
higher Vertebrata, was made with the precise structure 
which i t  exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal 
which possesses it to see, has undoubtedly received its death- 
blow. Nevertheless it is necessary to remember that there 
is a wider teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine 
of evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental 
proposition of evolution. T h a t  proposition is that  the whole 
world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual inter- 
action, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed 
by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the 
universe was composed.”’ And Darwin confesses “the ex- 
treme difficulty o r  rather impossibility of conceiving this 
immense and wonderful universe, including man with his 
capacity of looking far  backwards and far into futurity, as 
the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting 
I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelli- 
gent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I 
deserve to be called a Theist. This  conclusion was strong in 
*Huxley, Collected Essays, Vol. 2, p. 110. 
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my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I 
wrote the ‘Origin of Species’; and it is since that time that it 
has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. 
But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as 
I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that 
possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws 
such grand conclusions ?”l 
Finally, Henderson has summed up his conclusions on this 
subject in the following thoughtful sentences : “We may 
progressively lay bare the order of nature and define it 
with the aid of the exact sciences. Thus we may recognize it 
for what it is, and now a t  length we clearly see that it is 
teleological. But we shall never find the explanation of the 
riddle, for it concerns the origin of things. Upon this sub- 
ject clear ideas and close reasoning are no longer possible, 
for thought has arrived a t  one of its natural frontiers. 
Nothing more remains but to admit that the riddle surpasses 
us and to conclude that the contrast of mechanism with 
teleology is the very foundation of the order of nature, 
which must ever be regarded from two complementary 
points of view, as a vast assemblage of changing systems, 
and as an harmonious unity of changeless laws and qualities 
working together in the process of evolution.)” 
CONCLUSION 
T h e  great problems of the methods and causes of organic 
evolution and adaptation are slowly being solved. W e  have 
made many false starts and have had to retrace many steps, 
but nevertheless much progress has been made along many 
lines. Many attractive theories have had their day and are 
now abandoned; unfortunately we do  not know that many 
*Life and Letters, Vol. I, p. 282. 
2“The Order of Nature,” pp. 208, 209. 
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current theories may not suffer a similar fate. But to  certain 
theories in one form or another we come back again and 
again, and always they are more secure. This is especially 
true of the underlying idea in the theory of Darwin, that 
master of those who interpret Nature. 
But whether we have reached any satisfactory solution 
of evolution problems or not, we know a t  least that  these 
problems are being attacked in the only possible scientific 
way, viz., by observation, analysis, and experiment. Doubt- 
less some of these great problems will always remain un- 
solved, for Nature is infinite. It is not the possession of 
perfect truth, but its pursuit, which falls to our lot and fills 
up the measure of our lives; and we would not have it other- 
wise, “for to  travel hopefully is a better thing than to arrive, 
and the true success is to labor.” 
